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Torts
By Jerry B. Blackstock* and Steven B. Licata**
This article seeks to point out, examine, and comment on the significant developments in Georgia tort law during the period from June 1979
through May 1980. Of course, with over 300 appellate cases decided in
this area during one year, every case is not included, and we have endeavored to exercise our best judgment to include only the cases of significance to the practitioner.
I.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Several significant cases dealing with the area of medical malpractice
were decided during this year. A series of these dealt with the application
of the statute of limitations and the scope of Georgia Code Ann. section
3-1103,1 which provides a one-year statute of limitation for medical malpractice by leaving a foreign object in a patient's body. The court of appeals in Banks v. Dalbey' held that this statute applied to a situation
where the plaintiff had been treated by the defendant doctor for cuts
caused by a broken ceramic vase and the doctor had left pieces of the
vase in the plaintiff's hand. The suit was brought more than two years
after the original treatment, but less than one year after the discovery of
the glass left in the hand. The court of appeals, in an opinion with three
judges dissenting, including Judge Birdsong, read the statute literally and
held that the one year from discovery limitation applied in two situations:
* Partner in the firm of Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, Georgia. Davidson

College (B.A., 1966); University of Georgia (J.D., 1969). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
* * Associate in the firm of Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, Georgia. University of South Carolina (B.A., 1976; J.D., 1979). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. GA. CODe ANN. § 3-1103 (Supp. 1980), which reads as follows:
None of the limitations of section 3-1102 shall apply where a foreign object has
been left in a patient's body, but an action shall then be brought within one year
after such negligent or wrongful act or omission is discovered. For purposes of this
section, "foreign object" shall not include a chemical compound, fixative device or
prosthetic aid or device.
2. 150 Ga. App. 779, 258 S.E.2d 701 (1979).
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"(a) Where the foreign object was both placed in the body and left there
by the person treating the injury, or (b) Where a foreign object from some
source other '3than the person treating the injury was left in the body by
that person."

In reaching this decision, the court expressly refused to follow an earlier court of appeals decision that the legislature intended for the statute
to apply only to items placed in the body during a medical procedure.'
On certiorari, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and
adopted Judge Birdsong's dissent." The supreme court based its holding
on the rationales that the placing and leaving of the foreign object in the
patient's body are directly traceable to the doctor's malfeasance and that
the danger of belated, false or frivolous claims is eliminated.' The court
went on to quote from Judge Birdsong's dissent:
If the mere treatment of an injury which includes a hidden object in the

body unknown to the doctor or patient and not placed in the body by the
doctor can give rise to the limited continuing medical tort liability defined by the legislatively and narrowly defined exception relating to the

substances or objects used in surgical procedures and negligently left in
the body, then the distinction between the one-year and the two-year
period of limitations becomes blurred, even indistinguishable,
and ren7
ders the exception carved by the legislature meaningless.
In view of the holding in Banks v. Dalbey, the result and rationale of
another case decided by the court of appeals in this area is subject to
significant questions. In the case of Simons v. Conn.,' the court of appeals, in an opinion in which Judge Birdsong concurred, followed the case
of Forgay v. Tucker' and held that "when the injury resulting from a
tortious act is not immediately apparent the statute of limitation is tolled
so long as the victim could not in the exercise of ordinary care have
learned of it.''1 The court found that the language "except as otherwise

3. Id. at 780, 258 S.E.2d at 703.
4. Clark v. Memorial Hospital of Bainbridge, 145 Ga. App. 305, 306, 243 S.E.2d 695, 696
(1978). The Banks majority referred to this earlier finding as dictum and not binding on
them since the Clark court had decided that both GA.CODE ANN. §§ 3-1102 and 3-1103 had
run before the action was brought in that case, rendering an interpretation of GA. CODE
ANN. § 3-1103 unnecessary.
5. Dalbey v. Banks, 245 Ga. 162, 264 S.E.2d 4 (1980).
6. Id. at 163-64, 264 S.E.2d at 5.
7. Id. at 164, 264 S.E.2d at 5, quoting 150 Ga. App. at 786, 258 S.E.2d at 706 (Birdsong,
J., dissenting).
8. 151 Ga. App. 525, 260 S.E.2d 402 (1979).
9. 128 Ga. App. 497, 197 S.E.2d 492 (1973).
10. 151 Ga. App. at 528, 260 S.E.2d at 404, quoting 128 Ga. App. at 500, 197 S.E.2d at
494.

1980]

TORTS

provided in this chapter"" in Georgia Code Ann. section 3-1002 allows
the applicability of the general statute of limitations, Georgia Code Ann.
section 3-1004,1" which runs from the time when the right of action accrues, not from the time when the omission occurred. The majority went
on to reason that the right of action does not accrue until the plaintiff, in
the exercise of ordinary care, could have learned of or discovered the injury. The opinion in Simons cannot stand up to the distinction drawn by
Judge Birdsong and adopted by the supreme court in Dalbey between the
provisions of Georgia Code Ann. sections 3-1102 and 3-1103. The clear
intent of these sections was to distinguish between cases of misdiagnosis
and mistreatment and cases of leaving a foreign object in the body. According to the statutes, it is only the latter case that is of the nature of a
"continuing medical tort" 8 so that a discovery type of limitation statute
should apply. Although at the time of this writing Simons has not been
overruled, the writers of this article think it will be.
Other recent cases have also had a notable influence on the medical
malpractice area by clarifying the rule in Howard v. Walker. The supreme court held that the defendant in a legal malpractice case must produce an expert's opinion in his favor in order to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment. The cases decided by the supreme court this year
have consistently held that the testimony of the defendant himself or herself, by deposition or affidavit, is sufficient to support summary judgment
for the defendant.1 5 Several cases have dealt with the quality standards of
the expert testimony which must be offered by either the plaintiff or the
defendant to support their cases. In Georgia, a medical malpractice case
is judged by a standard of care which would be "exercised by the medical
community generally, not what a particular doctor would do in the circumstances." 16 This year it was held that when a plaintiff's doctor testified as to the medical practice and procedure in Fulton County and the
Atlanta area in general, then 'the testimony was legally insufficient and
could be excluded because such testimony referred only to a specific locality and therefore did not satisfy the requirement that the expert base
17
his opinion on the care exercised in the medical profession generally.

11.
12.
13.

GA. CODE ANN. § 3-1102 (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 3-1004 (1975).
245 Ga. at 164, 264 S.E.2d at 5.

14. 242 Ga. 406, 249 S.E.2d 45 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Payne v. Golden, 245 Ga. 784, 267 S.E.2d 211 (1980), rev'g Golden v. Payne,
152 Ga. App. 800, 264 S.E.2d 292 (1979); Parker v. Knight, 245 Ga. 782, 267 S.E.2d 222
(1980).

16. Slack v. Moorhead, 152 Ga. App. 68, 71, 262 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1979).
17. Williams v. Ricks, 152 Ga. App. 555, 263 S.E.2d 457 (1979).
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INTRAFAMILY RELATIONS

Intrafamily Immunity

Although several states have now judicially abolished intrafamily immunity,1 8 and although it is the clear modern trend to restrict this doctrine,10 the courts of Georgia seem reluctant to follow. 2 0 In fact, they have
expanded the reach of the doctrine during the past year. In the case of
Maddox v. Queen,"1 the intrafamily immunity doctrine was embraced on
public policy grounds: "To allow an unemancipated child to sue a parent
(or head of the household) would be against the public policy of this
state."'2 The court found the child's grandfather to be in loco parentis to
the child and applied the doctrine to prevent his granddaughter from
bringing a suit. The cases relied upon by the court 23 applied only to parent-child relations and the application of this doctrine outside of the parent-child relationship was a clear extension of the law in this area as
pointed out by the strong dissent of Judge Quillian.
B. Right of Wife to Sue For Her Own Medical Expenses
It has long been the rule in Georgia that "[iln the event of injury to
the wife, the right to recover the expenses incurred for the medical, hospital and funeral bills is not in her but in the husband. 2' 4 This rule was

recently applied by the court of appeals in Old Dominion Freight Line v.
Martina in which the court held that the measuring life expectancy for.
the calculation of expenses arising from permanent injury was that of the
injured wife and not the plaintiff husband.2 6 The court noted that this
was an issue of first impression in Georgia, but its impact could be very
limited. Although there was absolutely no mention of it in this opinion,
which was decided on January 22, 1980, Georgia Code Ann. section 532
510,

7

which is the statute relied upon to establish the rule that a hus-

18. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
19. Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1155 (1962); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).
20. See, e.g., Byington v. Lee, 150 Ga. App. 393, 258 S.E.2d 6 (1979); Jones v. Swett, 244
Ga. 715, 261 S.E.2d 610 (1979). Both cases, decided during the past year, apply the intrafamily immunity doctrine either to prevent recovery outright or to raise a question as to
the right to recover.
21. 150 Ga. App. 408, 257 S.E.2d 918 (1979).
22. Id. at 410-11, 257 S.E.2d at 919.
23. Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45
Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932).
24. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Floyd, 214 Ga. 232, 239, 104 S.E.2d 208, 214 (1958).
25. 153 Ga. App. 135, 264 S.E.2d 585 (1980).
26. Id. at 137, 264 S.E.2d at 587. This was an important issue in this case as the plaintiff
husband was 57 years old, while the injured wife was only 36.
27. GA. CoDE ANN. § 53-510 (1974).
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band must sue to recover his wife's medical expenses,"8 was repealed as of
April, 1979 by the legislature." With the repeal of Georgia Code Ann.
section 53-510, and the rising constitutional prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex, it seems clear that a wife will soon have to seek
recovery for her own medical expenses whether she contracts to be personally bound or nots and that the rule to the contrary, as of April 4,

1979, is a creature of the past in Georgia. The fact that a husband gratuitously paid the medical expenses for his wife should have no more significance than any other collateral source.
III.

SUCCESSIvE TORTFEASORS AND RELEASES

The supreme court, in Maxey v. Hospital Authority,31 has now reversed itself on the issue of the admissibility of parol evidence to explain
a release "against all the world"3' 2 by holding that parol evidence is not
admissible to vary its terms because such a release is "clear and
unambiguous.

''3

Maxey involved a plaintiff who was struck by an automobile and had
settled with the driver executing the release in question. Plaintiff then
filed suit against the hospital and a physician alleging subsequent malpractice in treating her injuries. The defendants, relying upon the release,
moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion, but the
court of appeals reversed on interlocutory appeal, holding that the second
suit against the hospital and the doctor must be dismissed because it
could only proceed on a "theory completely contradictory and inconsistent with the contentions made in the first suit."" In reversing the court
of appeals, the supreme court followed Knight v. Lowery on this issue
and found that "the two suits, one against the original and one against
the aggravating tortfeasor, were not necessarily contradictory or mutually
exclusive.""5 Presumably the sucessive defendant tortfeasor, when not
28.
29.

See 214 Ga. 239, 104 S.E.2d 214.
1979 Ga. Laws 469, 491-92, provides:
It is the intent of this Act to revise and modernize certain laws of this State which
relate to intrafamilial duties, rights, and obligations. . . . so as to comply with
those standards of equal protection under the law announced in . . . Orr v. Orr,
decided March 5, 1979. This Act and the provisions hereof shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes of this Act.
30. See 214 Ga. at 239, 104 S.E.2d at 214.
31. 245 Ga. 480, 265 S.E.2d 779 (1980).
32. Id. at 482, 265 S.E.2d at 781.
33. Id. (overruling Knight v. Lowery, 228 Ga. 452, 185 S.E.2d 915 (1971), on this issue
only).
34. Hospital Authority v. Maxey, 151 Ga. App. 777, 777, 261 S.E.2d 716, 717 (1979).
35. 245 Ga. at 481, 265 S.E.2d at 780.
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covered by an unambiguous release, will be allowed to offer evidence that
all damages, including those caused by the subsequent aggravation, were
paid in full in the settlement of the first suit. Such payment would bar a
second suit for damages for aggravation of the original injury.5 1
IV.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

In Allen Kane's Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes,37 the supreme court has
attempted to clarify agency law raised in motions for summary judgment
where an employee was driving a vehicle owned by the employer. As
pointed out by the court, "[T]he test to determine if the master is liable
[for the tortious action] is whether or not the servant was at the time of
the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business
of the master."" Under Georgia law, when it is established that a vehicle
is owned by A and driven by an employee of A, a presumption arises that
the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time
of the collision.39 The burden then shifts to the defendant-employer to
rebut the presumption by "clear, positive, and uncontradicted evidence."'40 In at least one case, Pest Masters, Inc. v. Callaway,"' the court
of appeals had held that the presumption even if "rebutted by uncontradicted evidence, must be determined by the jury."4 2 Therefore, under
that case summary judgment was not available when a vehicle was owned
by A and driven by an employee of A at the time of a collision.
The court in Allen Kane overruled Pest Masters on this issue and set
out the following test to determine whether evidence of agency submitted
by the plaintiff to overcome a motion for summary judgment on behalf of
the defendant-employer is sufficient:
When the uncontradicted testimony of the defendant and/or the em36. See Knight v. Lowery, 228 Ga. 452, 456, 185 S.E.2d 915, 918. In following Knight on
this point, the supreme court in Maxey distinguished Gilmore v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital
Authority, 132 Ga. App. 879, 209 S.E.2d 676 (1974), which had been relied upon by the
court of appeals. In Gilmore, the first suit had been one for wrongful death for which the
plaintiff had recovered the full value of the decedent's life. The supreme court in Maxey
reasoned that the ruling in Gilmore was based on the conclusion that the second suit was
barred under the policy against double recoveries. Maxey v. Hospital Authority, 245 Ga.
480, 481, 265 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1980). This question would apparently be left for a jury to
determine in any case not involving wrongful death.
37. 243 Ga. 776, 257 S.E.2d 186 (1979).
38. Id. at 777, 257 S.E.2d at 188, citing West Point Pepperell v. Knowles, 132 Ga. App.
253, 208 S.E.2d 17 (1974).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 133 Ga. App. 123, 210 S.E.2d 243 (1974).
42. Id. at 125, 210 S.E.2d at 245.

TORTS

19801

ployee shows that the employee was not acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident, the plaintiff must show, in addition to the facts which give rise to the presumption that he was in the
course of his employment, "some other fact" which indicates that the
employee was acting within the scope of his employment. If this "other
fact" is direct evidence, that is sufficient for the case to go to the jury.
However, when the "other fact" is circumstantial evidence, it must be
evidence sufficient to support a verdict in order to withstand the defendant's motion for summary judgment."
Circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a verdict must be either
inconsistent with defendant's testimony or, if consistent with defendant's
testimony, it must be so persuasive as to demand a finding for the plaintiff on the issue. Evidence consistent with defendant's testimony will not
avoid a summary judgment for defendant if it gives rise only to a "mere
inconclusive inference.""' The rule was applied by the court in Allen
Kane to affirm the grant of summary judgment because the plaintiff, in
response to the defendant-employee's affidavit that he was "bar-hopping"
at the time of the collision, could only argue that the defendant-employee
had "unrestricted authority to solicit prospective purchasers." The supreme court held this to be circumstantial evidence which was not inconsistent with the defendant-employee's testimony and which did not "demand a finding for the plaintiff on the issue."" This decision could well
be taken by the trial courts in Georgia to be a definition of the phrase "no
genuine issue as to any material fact, 47 which is the guide for the granting of summary judgment, but the extent of its application in areas other
than agency cannot be predicted at this time. It is clear, however, that in
a motion for summary judgment, a fact which may merely be inferred,
but is not demanded, from circumstantial evidence, will not defeat a motion that is supported by positive, uncontradicted evidence.'
V.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

In Hennessy v. Webb 49 the supreme court took well-settled principles
in the area of governmental immunity and applied them in such a way as
to cloud the law in the area. The court in Hennessy held that the act of a
43.
44.
45.
46.

243 Ga. at
Id. at 781,
Id. at 779,
Id. at 781,

780, 257 S.E.2d at 190.
257 S.E.2d at 190.
257 S.E.2d at 189.
257 S.E.2d at 190.
47. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-156(c) (1977).
48. See Withrow Lumber Company, Inc. v. Blackburn, 244 Ga. 549, 553, 261 S.E.2d 361,
363 (1979).
49. 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980), rev'g Webb v. Hennessy, 150 Ga. App. 326, 257
S.E.2d 315 (1979).
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public school principal in allowing a rug and mat to be placed too close to
a door and allowing it to remain there was a discretionary function, therefore entitling the principal to governmental immunity. The court first discussed the law of governmental immunity and found that the principal
was entitled to that immunity if the act complained of was a discretionary act as opposed to a ministerial act. This legal conclusion is not suprising nor is it noteworthy. However, holding that the act of allowing a mat
to remain too close to a door is discretionary would seem to greatly extend the law in this area. As Chief Justice Nichols notes in his dissent: "If
this act is discretionary then there are few others which will fall outside
such classification. In effect, the broad protection of government or sovereign immunity is being substantially extended by the court. I see no limits to this expansion."0 It is interesting to speculate how this decision
will be applied to other acts by other public officials, but as Chief Justice
Nichols has stated, it certainly is a broad expansion of a doctrine which is
becoming increasingly more criticized in other states.5 1
VI.

MISCLLANEOUS

2 the court of appeals, in a
Judicial Immunity. In Smith v. Hancock,"
case of first impression in Georgia, extended the doctrine of judicial immunity" to cover a prosecutor for acts performed "within the scope of his
jurisdiction."" The court noted that this "quasi-judicial immunity is
nearly as well-established in Anglo-American law as judicial immunity,"5' 5
and that the decision broke new ground only in the sense that this had
never been ruled upon in Georgia.
Negligent Inspection. The supreme court resolved a conflict between recent court of appeals decisions by holding that, in an action by
an employee against the employer's insurance company for negligent inspections, the plaintiff-employee can recover if he can demonstrate reliance either by himself or by his employer on the inspections made by the
insurance company." This holding aligns Georgia with the majority of
7
other states on this issue.5

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
(1980),

Id. at 333, 264 S.E.2d at 881 (Nichols, C.J., dissenting).
See RESTATEMENT (SECozn) OF TORTS § 895C, Comment f (1979).
150 Ga. App. 80, 256 S.E.2d 627 (1979).
See Gault v. Wallis, 53 Ga. 675 (1875).
150 Ga. App. at 81, 256 S.E.2d at 628.
Id.
Huggins v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 245 Ga. 248, 249, 264 S.E.2d 191, 192
rev'g 151 Ga. App. 377, 259 S.E.2d 742 (1979).
57. The court expressly adopted the rule as stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§ 324A (1978):
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to an-
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Guest Passenger Rule. In Crider v. Sneider,65 the supreme court
again aligned Georgia with the majority of other jurisdictions 9 in ruling
on a case of first impression in Georgia, "whether the owner of an automobile becomes the guest passenger by reason of the fact that another
occupant in the automobile assumes the driving. 6 0 The court reasoned
that since the host-guest relationship is dependent upon the furnishing of
hospitality by the host to the guest, the host-owner continues to extend
the hospitality, the furnishing of transportation, even if he becomes the
passenger. Therefore, the court reasoned, the owner remains the host
even when he or she stops driving and the guest-passenger rule does not
apply to require a showing of gross negligence as a prerequisite to recovery by the owner against the driver.

other which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person
or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the
harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the
undertaking.
58. 243 Ga. 642, 256 S.E.2d 335 (1979), rev'g, 148 Ga. App. 385, 251 S.E.2d 315 (1978).
59. See cases cited in the majority opinion, 243 Ga. at 646-47, 256 S.E.2d at 338.
60. Id. at 646, 256 S.E.2d at 338.

